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A development process where remittances and foreign aid are the main
economic resources of the local economy was defined by Bertram and
Watters as the mirab model (Migration, Remittances, Aid, and Bureau-
cracy; 1985). Bertram (1986, 1993) suggested that it is a perfectly “sus-
tainable” development strategy, as long as the “rent” from remittances
and international aid can be obtained for an indefinite period. But there is
a great reluctance on the part of officials and economists, from South
Pacific countries, regional institutions, donor country agencies, the Inter-
national Monetary Fund, or the World Bank, to accept this development
model as a valid and sustainable one. Somehow it does not seem right to
live off international aid and migrant remittances. There are some good
reasons to state a favorable case for mirab. Pacific Island peoples and
governments should not feel guilty about accepting aid and remittances,
because, in a way, such external resources represent revenues from “invis-
ible exports” to industrialized countries. By exporting labor and “geo-
strategic services,” small Pacific islands make the best use of the only
comparative advantage they may have that allows them to gain from inter-
national trade. Donor countries and migrant host countries also gain
from this form of international specialization.
In the first section of this paper, I show why some people hate mirab.
In the second, I show why everyone should love mirab.
Why Do (Some) People Hate mirab?
There Is No Such Thing as a Free Lunch
Some economists and development experts tend to look at remittance-
driven economies with a certain degree of scorn, calling them “rentier65
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66 the contemporary pacific • spring 1998economies,” a category akin to the “Dutch disease”–ridden “oil econo-
mies.” People from these islands seem to get “money for nothing,” from
foreign governments, and from relatives overseas. This privileged situation
is surely not sustainable in the long run: there is no such thing as a free
lunch in the global free market system. This kind of development process
somehow does not seem right, because remittances are not earned by the
island population.
Some authors have argued that since mirab led to such bad records of
growth in gross domestic product (gdp), “Some in the international aid
community are therefore recommending a re-examination, if not a reduc-
tion, of the ‘A’ and ‘B’ elements of mirab in the post cold-war era” (Pollard
1995, 12).
Remittances: Money for Nothing?
Another reason economists find remittances a touchy subject is that it
seems to be a highly irrational, hence unstable, behavior. The common
wisdom is that remittances and all intrafamily transfers are motivated by
purely altruistic motives, and as a result, are likely to decline over time as
the altruistic feeling might weaken with years away from home. There has
been much debate on the motives for private transfers (for a review, see
Cox 1987; Cox and Jimenez 1990).
It is often assumed that private transfers to family members, and remit-
tances in particular, are motivated by altruistic feelings (Becker 1974;
Becker and Tomes 1979; Cox 1987, 1990; Cox and Japelli 1990; Stark
1991a, 237–238).1 Some models allow for both an altruistic motive and a
self-interested “lending” motive (parents may lend to their children at
above-market interest rates [Cox 1990, 191; Cox and Japelli 1990]). Lucas
and Stark (1985) and Stark (1991a) proposed an “eclectic model” of “tem-
pered altruism or enlightened self-interest.” Families enter into informal
insurance contracts against income shortfalls; altruism, trust, and loyalty
between family members help to enforce the contract. The empirical evi-
dence reviewed by Cox and Jimenez (1990) does not give clear-cut conclu-
sions on the subject of altruism or self-interest as a motive for private trans-
fers: some studies have found a positive relationship between recipients’
income and transfer amounts (which contradicts the altruist hypothesis),
while other studies have found an inverse relationship (which supports
that hypothesis).
If altruistic motives were the main determinant, one would probably
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country and family became weaker and weaker (the “remittance decay”
hypothesis). In the case of Pacific Island migrants, there is evidence to the
contrary (see Brown, this issue). Many economists are uneasy with purely
altruistic motives, because it is the most irrational way for the typical
“economic person” to behave. Even some of the authors willing to pro-
pose theories of altruistic models of private transfers expressed doubts
about the empirical value of this hypothesis.2 “Altruism” might hide more
selfish motives, and might represent a rational decision of a family group
acting as a coalition, a “transnational corporation of kin” (Bertram and
Watters 1985) rather than as altruistic individuals:
In the South Pacific setting, migration involves not the dismembering of kin
groups but their internationalization (or transnationalization). . . . Family or
kin units in the small Pacific societies act and calculate on a transnational
scale, especially via the regional labour market. . . . The great majority of house-
holds are able to judge the relative merits of wage employment (locally and
offshore) and household productive activity on the land or sea. (Bertram 1986)
Economics is a dismal science in more ways than one: for each beauti-
ful altruistic motive admired by an anthropologist, an economist will tend
to see a down-to-earth, self-interested motive lurking behind it. When look-
ing at cultural values emphasizing sharing and working unselfishly for the
community, the economist tends to assume that they are somehow shaped
by the economic necessity of enforcing informal cooperation arrangements
between the individuals of the “coalition,” in order for them to benefit
from working together. This was stressed by Dasgupta in his book: “We
have to investigate what sustains (non-contractual) systems of reciprocity,
what encourages people to meet their obligations even when there is no
law to enforce them” (1993, 208).
Values of loyalty and solidarity are the tools invented by traditional
cultures to make cooperation efficient by reducing the risk of “free rider
behavior,” the cost of negotiating and enforcing informal arrangements,
and the cost of screening applicants for the coalition. To illustrate this,
Dasgupta showed that social norms favoring reciprocity of intergenera-
tional transfers between family members enable individuals to maximize
utility by smoothing out the consumption flow over their life cycle (1993,
sections 8.6 and 9.7). Norms of reciprocity are more developed in poor
countries, where individuals cannot count on social security systems and
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insurance, and annuity markets are imperfect. Therefore, intergenerational
transfers act as a substitute for old age insurance, and reciprocal help in
case of hardship acts as an informal insurance policy. For these reasons,
solidarity links are most developed in the poorest and most isolated
communities.3
I tend to favor a very restricted view of altruism. Some economists (such
as Becker 1974; Stark 1991a; and Cox 1987) suppose that altruists value
their family’s welfare in their own utility function, and therefore may be
willing to sacrifice some of their own welfare to increase that of other
family members. I assume, rather, that parents may care about their chil-
dren’s utility and may wish to increase it, but not at the expense of their
own welfare. That is, the pareto principle would guide intrafamily deci-
sions as well: the aim of parents is to make children better off, as long as
it does not make themselves worse off (than without transfers). Poirine
and Brown (1997) show that this “quasi altruism” hypothesis, involving
informal loans and loan repayments spanning the life cycle of parents and
children, may explain quite well what is going on with private transfers
from parents to children and then back from children to parents.
Aid and Remittances Crowd Out “Productive” Investments
It has often been found that aid and remittances are not conducive to
“sustainable development” through family exploitation or small business
investment in the remittance-receiving village sector. Aid and remittances
keep the domestic economy “frozen” in a state of low productivity (Mines
1981) because of low levels of domestic investment in the private sector.
This has been stressed recently by a number of writers, including Mac-
Master (1993), Duncan (1994), and Browne (1995).
Aid has alternatively helped island governments to maintain a policy of factor
and commercial protection and factor export and to postpone the creation of
an economy in support of domestic investment. . . . High levels of aid have rein-
forced government activity and traditional interests. High levels of aid have
lessened the need for alternate private activity, and the same aid has greatly
lessened, if not removed, the need to release domestic factors of production.
(Pollard 1995, 15–16)
Without improved domestic policy responses from the island states, more lib-
eral migration opportunities will not avert a doomsday scenario. Indeed, it is
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islands might actually discourage efforts to improve domestic policies. (Cuth-
bertson and Cole 1995, xiv)
These and other authors stressed the crowding-out effect of remittances,
combined with “easy subsistence lifestyle,” in various Pacific Island econ-
omies:
In the Cook Islands, Tonga and Western Samoa these [remittances] are a mixed
blessing as they undermine the incentive to work and are rarely spent on pro-
ductive investment. They are normally used for unproductive ceremonial pur-
poses or on imported luxury consumption items. (MacMaster 1993, 279)
These remittance inflows have had an adverse effect upon labour supply, lead-
ing to higher reservation wages and a corresponding reduction in the produc-
tion of traditional export crops. (World Bank 1990, 4)
The high degree of dependence on foreign grants and the safety valve of emigra-
tion [in Tonga] tends to retard competitiveness through upward pressure on
wage rates and loss of skilled manpower. (World Bank 1993a, iii)
On the one end, remittances provide a source of “export” revenue but, on the
other hand, they may crowd out other forms of export activity. This is not
necessarily a problem, but it is not clear that the net effect of remittances (and
aid) is conducive to long term economic viability and prosperity. (Cuthbertson
and Cole 1995, xiv)
The relatively low growth performance of Tonga and Western Samoa may in
part be explained by the damage done to their export sectors by the distor-
tionary effects of aid and remittance flows and the lack of government policy
to offset these effects. (Ahlburg 1991, 39)
[In Tonga] the work force has dramatically declined, i.e., those from 18 to 40
years of age. These are the important people in an agricultural economy and
they are migrating. More and more of those who remain are taking up white
collar jobs, which are now relatively easy to obtain. Most of the land lies idle.
There are fewer and fewer people to work it. Many of the older generation are
living off remittances from their sons and daughters overseas, so they no
longer have to push themselves to do anything more than grow food for them-
selves. (Finau 1994, 308)
There is a crowding-out effect of aid and remittances on the local pri-
vate sector, and at the family level it is likely that investments in educa-
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insofar as the expected rate of return on human investment (with emigra-
tion) in the child appears much greater than the expected rate of return
on agricultural, industrial, or commercial investment. (This is why emi-
gration takes place: families decide consciously to invest in the education
of future migrants rather than in business, farming, or fishing ventures;
Poirine 1995b.)
The “booming sector” is the “labor export sector” or “future migrant
production” sector, and all other activities are crowded out from labor
and capital resources because the rate of return on this activity is higher
than on all others. In particular, the reservation wage (or reservation
income) becomes higher, leading to less employment in manufacturing,
tourism, and “traditional” agricultural exports such as copra, vanilla,
coffee, mother of pearl, and the like.
The Tongan economy displays all the characteristic markings of the “Dutch
disease,” where a dominant export activity attracts a disproportionate com-
mand over resources, pushes up domestic production costs, and reduces inter-
national competitiveness. In the Tongan case the “booming” sector has
become development assistance and migrants’ remittances. (Sturton 1992, 3)
Aid, as an artificial exogenous shock to the economy supporting government
demand, shifts the economy away from the nation’s comparative advantage.
. . . the comparative advantage sectors suffer at the expense of others. (Weis-
man 1990, 20)
This adverse effect of remittances on the traded goods sector, known as
the Dutch disease, has been studied by Weisman (1990), Ahlburg (1991),
and Sturton (1992):
Aid and remittances are partially spent on non traded goods and this increase
in demand puts upward pressure on the real exchange rate (the relative price
of non traded goods relative to traded goods), drawing resources out of other
sectors, for example, agriculture and manufacturing, and into services, includ-
ing government employment. (Ahlburg 1991, 37)
In particular, Ahlburg showed by means of regression analysis that in
American Sâmoa labor force participation is adversely affected by the
receipt of remittances (1991, appendix 2), and that the manufacturing sec-
tor in Tonga and Western Sâmoa is less developed than in countries with
a similar per capita gross domestic product. Similarly, Weisman, using a
computable general equilibrium model, showed that high Australian bud-
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The production of nontradables increases at the expense of tradables and
the country experiences a real exchange rate appreciation” (1990).
In the context of Pacific Island economies, where one of the main po-
tential foreign exchange resources is tourism, the Dutch disease or “boom-
ing sector” of aid and remittances, by driving up the cost of resources in
this sector, reduces the rewards of investments, and drives out capital.4
Another adverse consequence of the Dutch-disease effect of remittances
and aid is an overvalued currency: “Remittances lead to an ‘overvalued’
exchange rate and may partly explain the relative poor performance of
manufactured exports. An overvalued exchange rate may also retard
growth in tourism” (Ahlburg 1991, 53).
Remittances Facilitate Nonproductive Expenditures, Create Dependency 
on Imports, and Perpetuate Trade Imbalances
According to many authors, remittances appear to be spent mostly on
“nonproductive” housing and consumption expenditure, a fact that seems
to reinforce the “rentier economy” theory. People tend to use remittances,
not for productive investment, but only to improve their standard of liv-
ing. “At the national level, estimates for Tonga suggest that about 70% of
remittances were spent on imported consumer goods, including tinned and
preserved food, beverages and tobacco” (Connell and Brown 1995, 21). As
a consequence, if for any reason the remittance flow decreased, the recip-
ients would not be ready to increase local production rapidly and would
suffer because of a severe shortage of goods. “Tonga’s poor savings per-
formance can be attributed largely to the private sector, particularly to
the prevalence of high rates of personal consumption. The reasons for
high personal consumption . . . are believed to be related to high levels of
personal transfers, cultural factors that tend to weaken the savings motive,
and low per capita incomes” (Fairbairn 1991, 31). This, it is argued, makes
the country overly dependent on imported goods, not only for manufac-
tured products, but also for agricultural products including food. (The
caricatural example here is Nauru, where agriculture no longer exists,
and people eat almost exclusively canned products bought with the reve-
nue from phosphate exports, with the consequence of a very high inci-
dence of diabetes in the local population.)
The fact that the flow of remittances is largely channeled into domestic
consumption is said to result in trade imbalance and a savings-investment
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ings, which has a negative effect on domestic investment. “Large private
remittances and official grant inflows have enhanced consumption and
resulted in negative gross domestic savings equivalent to nearly a quarter
of the gdp” (World Bank 1993a, 3).
Are Remittances “Sustainable”?
Many authors doubt that remittance flows can be sustainable over time,
because they believe that remittances are given from altruistic motives,
and that those altruistic feelings will weaken over time. If aggregate remit-
tances are bound to decline with time, as would be the case if most new
emigrants were children or parents of emigrants reuniting with their rela-
tive in the host country, then it is doubtful that the country would be able
to count on a sustained flow of remittances. As more and more emigrants
have fewer and fewer relatives to send remittances to, the aggregate amount
of remittances should in the end decline, at least as a percentage of the
total resident and expatriate population.
Accepting Remittances with Apology
If only remittances were used for productive investment, they would ac-
quire some redeeming social value! Recipients could then be pardoned for
their sin, anti-mirab puritanical missionaries seem to imply. Unfortunately
almost everything is spent on imported goods, requiring apologies to
comply with economic orthodoxy. Even authors who are not predisposed
to be hostile to the remittance-driven economies tend to want to justify
them by trying to prove, against all available evidence, that remittance
income is saved and invested more than seems to be the case at first
glance, and in general more than other sources of income. For example,
Walker and Brown (1995) found that remittance-receiving households in
Tonga save more (8 percent of their income, against 2.5 percent for non-
receiving households), but in Western Sâmoa the reverse is true (4 percent
of income for recipients, 10.5 percent for nonrecipients). In any case, the
savings ratio for money remittances was found to be 8 percent in Tonga
(compared to 8.2 percent of total income for recipient households), and 4
percent in Western Sâmoa (compared to 3.6 percent of total income for
recipient households). This means that the average propensity to save is
no different for remittances than for total income, and this is just what
one would expect, because remittances are just one source of income
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and Connell 1993) have insisted that remittances are often saved or used
to finance investments in housing, farming, or business ventures, such as
“flea market” operations in Tonga (selling goods sent by overseas rela-
tives hardly seems to be an investment, insofar as it does not add to the
productive capacity of the domestic economy). Faeamani gave another
example of the “remittance with apology” opinion:
Through the loss of younger adults, there is a consequent reduction in garden
size and production but, by way of substitution, an inflow of cash in the form
of remittances and goods, and a greater dependence on the international econ-
omy. While not denying that there are ill effects of emigration and remittance
use, in the last decade Tonga has seen significant changes at the village level
which have been initiated and funded from remittances, many of which have
been beneficial. (Faeamani 1995, 140; my emphasis)
The author had to concede to economic orthodoxy by writing that remit-
tances “have ill effects” in theory, before saying that in practice they have
been doing a lot of good.
It is well known that both Tonga and Western Sâmoa exhibit negative
domestic savings out of gross domestic product (but positive national sav-
ings out of gross national product, including net private transfers; Kioa
1993). Consumption expenditures thus represent 114 percent of gross
domestic product in Tonga. Should the Tongans and Western Samoans
apologize for this?
International Aid: “Money for Nothing”?
Pacific Island economies receive considerably more aid per capita than
any other country or territory in the world (Poirine 1993b, 1995c). Com-
pared to the average aid per capita received by less developed countries
(ldcs), small independent islands with a population of less than a million
receive 8 times more, independent Pacific islands receive 10 times more,
Pacific Island territories or associated states 233 times more, French over-
seas departments and territories 354 times more, and French Polynesia 366
times more (see tables 2 and 3).
Many authors believe that aid has been doing more harm than good
in small Pacific islands. Just like remittances, aid tends to make for a
“booming sector” (Weisman 1990; Ahlburg 1991), crowding out pro-
ductive sector investment, especially when used to boost public sector
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sector. In French Polynesia for example, housecleaners, gardeners, and
janitors can earn at least twice as much as civil servants as they can as
private sector employees, a situation that drives up the reservation wage
at which people are willing to work in the private sector (Poirine 1993c,
1994).
Ahlburg attempted to measure the “distortionary effect of aid and re-
mittances” on the economy of Tonga and Western Sâmoa. He found that
the share of manufacturing in those two countries was, respectively, 8
percent and 12 percent, against a norm of 17 percent and 25 percent re-
spectively for countries with comparable gross domestic product per capita
(Ahlburg 1991, 38). He concluded that “in Tonga and Western Samoa the
share of manufacturing in gdp is less than half of what is expected for
countries at similar levels of gdp per capita.” He interpreted this as a
proof of a Dutch-disease effect of aid and remittances on the economies
of Tonga and Western Sâmoa. “At least part of this shortfall can be ex-
plained by the distortionary effect of aid and remittance flows decreasing
the competitiveness of the export sector” (Ahlburg 1991, 38).
Some authors also pointed out the crowding-out effect of aid on the
public sector’s human resources: the management of aid requires much
time from the best civil servants, which detracts from other important
tasks. The brightest among them often accept positions with donor agen-
cies, where they earn much more than with their former employer (Brown
1992). This “time and brain drain” adversely affects the performance of
the local public sector.
Why We Should Love mirab
In this section I would like to answer the arguments exposed in the “hate”
section one by one, and then explain why mirab may be loved after all.
There Is No Such Thing as a Free Lunch
True! Remittances are not free lunches. They don’t come out of the blue,
out of pure kindness of the remitters to the recipients, as I have shown
elsewhere (Poirine 1995b, 1997). They represent three kinds of trans-
actions: repayments of a loan made earlier to the remitter by relatives to
help finance human capital investment; money lent to young children or
other relatives to help them finance their education; and money sent to
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these three “waves” of remittances during the lifetime of the emigrant
make up the observed remittance flow over time, or what I call the three
waves theory of remittances.
National accounts do not measure investment in human capital, or the
returns from it. Expenditures in educating children, which are investments,
are recorded as consumption expenditures. These expenditures entail sac-
rifices (ie, savings in kind, not monetary savings); family members must
work more or consume less because children are excused from working
for parents while they get an education. This sacrifice is a saving, a loan
in kind, which is then paid back when the child reaps the monetary bene-
fits of the educational investment in a foreign country.5
Therefore, remittances are just the visible tip of an iceberg that I call
the informal family credit market. Some of the transactions on this mar-
ket may be observed only when they happen to be recorded in statistics
because they cross frontiers.6 This is not just “money for nothing.” It is
an efficient informal family savings-and-loan system that enables the
“transnational corporation of kin” (Bertram and Watters 1985) to get the
highest returns on human capital investments. Children educated at a
lower cost in the islands are sent to the higher earning foreign labor mar-
kets and expected to pay back their debt to the family. Children from
Tonga or Western Sâmoa could not borrow from banks for their educa-
tion because they have no collateral. The informal family financial market
(Poirine 1995b) enables them to do so at the least cost, while rewarding
their family with remittances by paying back the loan with interest (a
“family shadow rate of interest,” which should lie between the home mar-
ket rate on savings deposits and the home market rate on borrowings).7
My theory of remittances (Poirine 1995b, 1997) does not rely on altru-
istic motives. To finance their education, that is, invest in their human
capital, future emigrants borrow informally, in kind or in cash, from rela-
tives and pay back their debt over time, with interest. It is all informal of
course; nothing is on paper, not even the rate of interest or the duration of
the payback period, but people know what they owe each other, more or
less, and repay the correct amount with interest, even if the interest rate
might be zero at times. Such transactions may be called reciprocal gifts by
anthropologists. Some part of the loan is not in monetary form, but in
kind. When a family has to give up child labor on the family holding and
reduce its per capita production and consumption, this is a loan in kind,
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will have to be paid back also, sometimes partly in kind (goods sent, air-
fares paid). The child who does not emigrate pays back in kind, by help-
ing the parents until their deaths. The one who emigrates, who cannot be
there to help, has to send cash to repay the debt; what was an internal, in-
kind transfer then becomes recorded in official statistics as remittances.
From the family’s point of view, nothing changes. From the national
accounts’ point of view, there is an increase in imports and domestic con-
sumption (because of remittances), and a decrease in gross domestic prod-
uct and domestic investment (because there is a decrease in rural produc-
tion when only the old and the very young stay, while young adults
emigrate to obtain higher returns on their educational investment from
overseas labor markets where labor productivity is higher than in the
home country).
Aid with Apology, “Money for Nothing,” and the Puritanical Ideology
Aid seems to be blessed when it is used for investment, but condemned
when used for private or public consumption. This moral interference in
the economic debate was well described by Tisdell: “Donors may have a
preference for aid for investment purposes rather than direct income
transfers, and especially for aid that supports effort. This is a reflection of
the puritanical belief in the Western world that reward should be for
effort. Consequently, even investment aid involving a negative return may
be preferred to ‘direct handouts’ ” (1990, 148). As I show later, this
moralistic tone is clearly misplaced, considering that aid has little to do
with handouts and much more to do with trading geostrategic services for
cash.
The Crowding-Out Effect: Distortion or Optimal Allocation?
It is arguable whether the crowding-out effect of remittances and aid on
“traditional” productive activity is a distortion in resource allocation or
the consequence of optimal resource allocation. I have cited many authors
who have implied that remittances (and aid) crowd out resources (capital
and labor) from traditional subsistence or export activities. This argument
was dealt with by Bertram and Watters:
The rapid increase in rent incomes of small-island communities over the past
three decades has radically changed both the economic incentives and the con-
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income. The investment of kin-group labour in the production of an agricul-
tural surplus for sale on uncertain markets is only one of a number of alterna-
tive strategies. Kindred can be expected to evaluate the return on such invest-
ment relative to the alternatives. On this basis it would be expected that as the
alternatives to commercially oriented agriculture would improve, so a reallo-
cation of household effort away from agriculture would take place. (Bertram
and Watters 1985, 511)
This is just what is required for efficient economic behavior: that the
family allocates its resources to the highest productive use, even if it hap-
pens that this particular use is not “productive” in the “domestic” econ-
omy, but rather in a “foreign” economy. Its returns are “invisible,” most of
them are “unrecorded,” but families do not care, because they know better
than to read inaccurate national account statistics. The Dutch disease may
not be a disease after all. These are not “windfall gains” like the gains from
the discovery of mineral resources such as oil or phosphates. This economic
behavior is a conscious strategy of families and countries: “Families delib-
erate carefully about which members would be most likely to do well over-
seas and be reliable in sending remittances” (Gailey 1992, 465). This is a
rational and deliberate decision of families to push their comparative ad-
vantage in international trade: it is most rational to export labor when the
returns on human capital investments are higher abroad than at home,
and when they surpass returns on domestic physical investment in tradi-
tional subsistence or export activity. “This implies no lack of entrepreneur-
ship, flexibility, or diligence on the part of Islanders—on the contrary, the
‘mirab effect,’ like its close relative ‘Dutch disease,’ arises precisely because
of the economic responsiveness and flexibility of Island household units
in their open-economy situation” (Bertram and Watters 1985, 512).
What would really be a “bad” allocation of resources, a “waste” of
human resources, would be to force bright young Tongans and Samoans
to work at home with their parents growing taro or gathering copra,
rather than getting a good education and migrating to Australia, New
Zealand, or Hawai‘i and sending remittances to their parents.
The “Bad” Effect of Remittances on Savings and Investment:
An Optical Illusion?
Dasgupta addressed this question remarkably, stressing in his book that
policies emphasizing the need to promote investment in developing coun-
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from national accounts are misleading: “Saving is conventionally taken to
mean consumption forgone today for the purposes of greater consump-
tion in the future. . . . it is more appropriate to regard saving as an activity
that is undertaken today for the purpose of increasing productivity (of
say, labor), and thereby consumption in the future” (1993, 245).
When adults spend less on their own consumption to give to the chil-
dren, when they forgo a child’s labor on the family holding to enable the
child to get an education, they are really saving for their old age and
investing in human capital. But national accounts do not record this as
savings or investment, but as consumption in the household. The accounts
record less production and more consumption expenditures on local or im-
ported goods, needed when the household’s autarkic production declines
because child labor is no longer available. Even though adults save in this
way, and children borrow from adults to finance their investment in edu-
cation, these savings and investments are not recorded, because they take
place inside the household: the intrafamily saving and investment flows
are neglected, except when they happen to cross national boundaries, in
the form of remittances. Adults’ recorded savings seem low because they
don’t have to save for their old age, but they have to provide for their
parents and their children living in the household through consumption
expenditures, to make sure that their children will do the same for them
later. Children and young adults borrow less through official financial
institutions, because intergenerational transfers within the family act as a
substitute for imperfect capital, insurance, and annuity markets (see Das-
gupta 1993; Kotlikoff and Spivak 1981).
It is wrong to use conventional national accounting methods to esti-
mate domestic savings as the difference between gross domestic product
and consumption in an economy where most of the “production” takes
place overseas. If domestic consumption exceeds gross domestic product
in countries like Tonga, it is because gross disposable national income,
including net transfers such as aid and private money transfers (official
remittances) is much greater than gross domestic product. Brown has
shown that official private transfers are grossly underestimated in the case
of Tonga and Western Sâmoa (1996; see table 1).
In using the national accounts’ measure of “consumption expendi-
ture,” one should be careful in distinguishing which consumption expen-
ditures correspond to educational investment (that is, forgone savings due
to lower production and higher consumption on the family holding while
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cational investments that were made by sacrificing first period consump-
tion (see Poirine 1997). “Building on the expectation of a high cross rate
of return to the joint decisions to educate, say, the maturing son and then
‘expel’ him to the urban sector, migration and the education preceding it
thus substitute for the credit deficiency” (Stark 1991a, 212).
For families to invest in human capital rather than in the family holding
is a rational and optimal strategy because the rate of return on human cap-
ital is greater (thanks to emigration) than the rate of return on investment
in domestic activity. In addition, starting with the second generation mi-
grant, the availability of loanable funds from migrants at a “family rate”
lower than the market borrowing rate for family holding investment in-
creases the profitability of human capital investment compared to family
holding investment (which then entails a higher borrowing cost; see Poi-
rine 1997). This strategy is a better way to achieve sustainable develop-
ment of the national community, whatever its residence, if international
migration is not restricted in any way at the sending or receiving end.
Dependence on Imports: Good or Bad?
As for dependence on imports, all islands, and all small economies, for
that matter, with standards of living exceeding the subsistence level, rely
heavily on imports. It is not pathological but logical. The smaller the econ-
omy, the greater the international specialization required to benefit from
economies of scale and comparative advantage in international trade
(Poirine 1993a, 1995c). The island must have one or two export com-
modities to pay for the many diverse imports it cannot produce locally
because it is too small to do it efficiently. The question is, what is the
comparative advantage of a small island economy? Some islands do very
well with tourism (Hawai‘i), or tax havens (Bahamas, Cayman Islands,
Bermuda); some try tax-free export manufacturing zones (Mauritius,
Fiji); some try the export of “strategic services,” such as the Federated
States of Micronesia, Palau, the Marshall Islands, Guam, French Polyne-
sia, the Falkland Islands; and some choose a combination of these strate-
gies. And then some choose to export labor. There is nothing wrong with
this option, if nothing better is available. The kind of dependence on
imports acquired by exporting labor is no worse than the one acquired by
specializing in sugar, tourism, or tax havens. The balance of trade seems
catastrophic but, as can be seen in table 1 from the examples of Tonga
and Western Sâmoa, this is largely because they have invisible exports
Table 1. Official and adjusted current account balance for  Western Sâmoa 1992
Amount 
(current us$ 
millions)
Percent of 
Gross 
Domestic 
Product
a Gross domestic product 148.4 100.0
b Net factor income from abroad 193.1 2.1
c = a + b Gross national product 151.5 102.1
d = c + i Gross national income* 194.9 131.3
e = f − g Merchandise trade balance −104.2 −70.2
f Exports 5.8 3.9
g Imports 110.0 74.1
h Services (net exports) 17.0 11.4
i Private unrequited transfers 43.4 29.2
j Official unrequited transfers 18.5 12.5
k = c + h + i + j Official current account balance −25.3 −17.1
l Unrecorded private transfers† -42.1 -28.4
m Unrecorded imports (goods carried)† 12.2 8.2
n = k + l − m Adjusted current account balance 4.6 3.1
o = i + l Exports of labor services 85.5 57.6
p = j Exports of geostrategic services 18.5 12.5
q = h + o + p Total services trade balance 120.9 81.5
r = c + o + p Adjusted gross national income 255.5 172.2
Sources: Pacific Economic Bulletin statistical annex, 10(1) 1995; Brown 1996.
Notes: *GDP + net factor income + net private transfers
†Computed from Brown 1996, Table 2
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ity of this kind of export, compared to more traditional ones.
Accepting Remittances without Apology
There is nothing wrong with the fact that a country spends more than it
produces domestically, if it happens that the export of labor is the major
resource: this export activity does not appear in the gross domestic prod-
uct, but the recorded part of it does show up in private transfers, thus con-
tributing to gross national product. As a percentage of gross domestic
product, recorded private transfers represented 24.1 percent in Tonga in
1993, 23.4 percent in Western Sâmoa (Brown 1996). According to Brown,
unrecorded transfers (goods, money carried by relatives, airfares paid to
visiting relatives) to Tonga and Western Sâmoa represented respectively
185 percent and 187 percent of official recorded money transfers (1996,
table 2). This means that total remittances, or the receipts from the “ex-
port of labor services,” really represented 54 percent of gross domestic
product in Tonga, and 68 percent in Western Sâmoa.
One could go further in this direction of rejecting conventional
national accounting. Insofar as what counts in the end is the overall wel-
fare of the total population born in the country, regardless of its residence,
one should really estimate a “gross transnational disposable income” fig-
ure, which would add to gross disposable income, on top of official aid,
not only private transfers (recorded and unrecorded), but the total dispos-
able income of the population born in the country and residing overseas
(regardless of whether or not it is remitted). If such a figure were com-
puted for Tonga or Western Sâmoa, there is no doubt that the per capita
transnational disposable income would rank with those countries in the
middle-income category, not in the low-income category, as is the case at
present.
International aid accounts for approximately 9.6 percent of gross
domestic product in Tonga, 10.6 percent in Western Sâmoa. As will be
seen, this is not “money for nothing,” but an invisible export of strategic
services: aid is trade. Therefore, by adding all visible and invisible ex-
ports, including labor services and geostrategic services, one gets a very
large surplus of the balance of official and unofficial trade of goods and
services for Tonga and Western Sâmoa (table 1).
It is not necessary to apologize when using for consumption and hous-
ing expenditures the receipts from an invisible export that is itself the re-
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ble loan that originates from invisible savings, recorded as consumption
expenditures (to the benefit of children). Just because national accounts
see only the tip of the iceberg (the remittances, market expenditures) and
not the base of the iceberg (the family’s internal financial market, unre-
corded savings and loans, and the prior invisible human investments that
made remittances possible), there is no reason to make people feel guilty
about accepting remittances and using them to better their living standards
and increase human capital investments!
The Sustainability of Remittances
I have addressed this matter in detail in another paper (Poirine 1997). It is
not at all obvious that, provided no legal restriction prevents emigration,
remittances should not grow steadily over time. As long as the migrant
population is composed mainly of adults wishing to retire in the home
country, it is very unlikely that the remittance flow will decay over time.
Only when families tend to reunite in the host country, where children are
brought up, and when older emigrants retire there, is the remittance flow
likely to decline. Sound economic policies should help to prevent such a
trend.
The sustainability of aggregate remittances rests crucially on the extent
of migration. Too much emigration will in the end “kill” the aggregate
remittance flow to the home country. Relatives are likely to reunite with
remitters in the host country, and older emigrants might increasingly
choose to retire in the host country where their children live. Such deci-
sions will weaken the motive for remitting, insofar as fewer and fewer
relatives will be left at home to help. If one plots on an X-Y graph aggre-
gate remittances against the share of emigrants in the total population,
the result is a “hill”: the curve will rise at first, starting from zero remit-
tances (when there are 0 percent emigrants), then reach a maximum (for a
share of M percent emigrants), and finally fall to zero when there is no-
body left on the island to remit to (100 percent emigrants; Poirine 1997).
It is important to know if a country’s position is on the left or the right of
the top of the hill. If on the left, it can continue to expand emigration and
obtain more aggregate remittances; if on the right, it will have already
passed the maximum. Then if the proportion of emigrants continues to
rise (that is, if the emigrant population rises faster than the nonemigrant
population), aggregate remittances will decline (even though they don’t
decline per capita in the receiving country, because there are fewer and
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law of diminishing marginal productivity of emigration in the production
of aggregate remittances. Therefore, emigration should be used moderate-
ly if the aim is to generate a sustainable flow of remittances. It is in the
home countries’ interest, in particular, to limit family reunions and retire-
ments in the host country, because this is the main cause of a fall in remit-
tances sent by emigrants to the home country. To maximize remittance
amount per emigrant, sending countries should encourage children to stay
(by lowering the cost of education and improving its quality) and retired
emigrants to return (by preserving emigrants’ rights to own and inherit
land, and by securing agreements with host countries to preserve the right
of former emigrants to receive their pensions in their home country).
Provided this rule of moderate use is observed,8 and migration outlets
are kept open in the host countries, even if a country has reached point
M, the flow of aggregate remittances may still grow with time, at a pace
set by the rate of total population growth (emigrants plus nonmigrants),
plus the rate of growth of income per capita of emigrants in the host
country.
The recent experiences of the Cook Islands, Tonga, and Western Sâmoa
seem to show that remittances are rather more stable and sustainable over
time than are receipts from agricultural exports or tourism. Therefore, it
is probably an optimal policy to specialize in “labor export,” as long as
agreements between the governments of the receiving and sending coun-
tries ensure that legal immigration outlets are secured for the Islanders in
the long run. This is more likely to happen for Pacific Islanders than for
other immigrants because their total populations are small compared to
those of the host countries: their share of total immigration is very small in
most host countries, even if emigration is widespread in the sending island
country or territory.
The Benefits of (Visible) Capital Investment Are Not Higher than the 
Benefits of (Invisible) Human Capital Investment
There is a universal tendency to overlook the benefits of human capital
investments compared to those of “productive,” “physical,” “private sec-
tor” investments, because the latter appear in national accounts figures,
while the former do not. There is no reason to privilege “physical” invest-
ment over “human” investment in economic development. Quite the con-
trary. Many grandiose projects in the third world have turned out to be
great wastes of money because the human capital factor was overlooked.
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tional aid, could not be put to productive use, and became white elephants.
It isn’t merely saving that matters, it is also the productivity of investment.
. . . During the 1980s the rate of investment in even low-income sub-Saharan
countries (excluding Nigeria) averaged somewhere around 18 per cent of their
aggregate output. However, the rate of growth of output averaged only 1.4
per cent . . . among the poorest countries, there has in fact been a negative cor-
relation between saving rates and rates of growth of national income per head.
(Dasgupta 1993, 249, quoting Stern 1989).
Many economic success stories, like those of Hong Kong and Singapore,
prove the importance of the human capital factor. Empirical studies on
the factors of growth tell the same story: the quality of the labor factor is
more important, in many instances, than the quantity of capital in
explaining the rate of growth.
When this investment in human capital pays off in a foreign country,
through emigration, it seems to be “lost” to the sending country. But this
is not so, because remittances represent precisely the return on this invest-
ment. Moreover, moneys not sent but saved in the host country may ulti-
mately benefit the sending country at a later stage, when emigrants retire
home, for example, or come back to set up a small business.
The productivity of investment, and therefore its pattern, is what
matters, more than its size as recorded in national accounts. Expenditures
on health care, education, housing, and nutrition enhance future labor
productivity: therefore they are investments, although national accounts
record them as either private or public consumption expenditures, which
leads to biased policy recommendations on the part of international experts
from donor organizations, who invariably favor more investment in “hard-
ware.” Investments in education have very high returns, because they pay
off after emigration overseas to an industrial country where the produc-
tivity of labor is much higher than in the island. In such a setting, where
emigration to a rich country is easy, it is an optimal choice to favor
human investment instead of domestic capital investment, even at the
expense of growth in gross domestic product. It follows that one should
not be sorry about the minimal growth record of the Pacific Islands
following the mirab pattern of development, since gross domestic prod-
uct is not the appropriate indicator of Islanders’ welfare.
When economists criticize Pacific Islands’ dependence on aid and
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human capital that led to migrant remittances, and the hidden export of
present and future geostrategic services that brings about a steady flow of
international aid to island countries and territories. To specialize in geo-
strategic export and in labor service export, to invest in family human
capital for migration purposes instead of private sector capital investment
is the optimal strategy if it corresponds to an international specialization
according to the comparative advantage of the Pacific Island countries.
The Welfare Gains from Emigration
What are the benefits of migrations? As the level of education in the home
country increases, the higher rate of growth in the quality of the country’s
human capital allows a higher rate of growth per capita, provided emi-
gration is internal, from villages to cities. If emigration is international,
remittances improve both the standard of living and the balance of pay-
ments in the sending country. In the long run, the better educational level,
arising from the inducement families have to send their children to school
because of the availability of emigration opportunities, is always a posi-
tive factor for the country: emigrants send remittances if they are away,
and if they return the island countries benefit from the education and
working skills acquired abroad. This is especially true of island countries
with a narrow resource base and very small markets, such as most of the
Pacific and Caribbean islands. Domestic development opportunities are
limited by transport cost, the impossibility of reaching large-scale econo-
mies and agglomeration economies, the limited land surfaces, and the very
small internal markets.
In this context, emigration may well be the only option for improv-
ing the population’s welfare level in the long run, when other attrac-
tive options, such as tourism, military bases, tax havens, or fisheries,
are not available. It relieves families from the law of diminishing returns
by preventing higher and higher population density on the land they
work, and it offers them an alternative source of cash income, enabling
them to import consumption goods unavailable on the island, such as
motorcycles, outboard motors, cars, or television sets. The same level of
imports, reached through the development of manufacturing exports, the
acceptance of large foreign military activities, or of tourism on a very
large scale, might be far more disruptive of the indigenous culture and
might have some social and psychological costs for indigenous popula-
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seem to show.
Welfare gains from emigration have been shown to be a very general
extension of the welfare-gains-from-trade theorem: all individuals from
the sending and receiving countries can be made to benefit from those
gains, provided there is a compensation scheme whereby emigrants pay
nonmigrants of their own country of origin a (carefully calculated) com-
pensation, thereby ensuring that no individual is made worse off than
before emigration occurred (Kemp 1993). This is, in effect, more or less
what remittances achieve. Thus, policies to counter the Dutch-disease effect
of emigration and remittances on private domestic savings and private
domestic sector investment might be superfluous or, even worse, detri-
mental to the “national” welfare of a community made up of “transna-
tional” families.
Another welfare gain from emigration cannot be measured. The mirab
system opens up the set of available opportunities to Islanders. All indi-
viduals may exercise more choice over their lifestyle and be freer to choose
their geographical, cultural, social, and economic environment at differ-
ent stages of life, according to personal tastes, which may vary with age.
Many young people, for example, will want to emigrate to see the big
cities of the world. Many older adults will want to retire to their home
village. Those who find it hard to adapt to western ways will come back
sooner and live a more traditional, modest but unhurried lifestyle on the
island, with imported amenities that could not exist without remittances
from relatives. This model gives Islanders a choice. They can have the best
of both worlds—better living standards in the islands, and a fallback vil-
lage sector for emigrants who have had enough of the “rat race” of the
western industrial cities. This very important welfare-enhancing feature
of the migration network system is hard to measure, but it should not be
neglected. Most people living in the industrial states don’t have this
choice (or think they don’t).
If it were possible to compute the gross transnational disposable in-
come of Tonga, including not only remittances, but the total overseas in-
come of the emigrant population (45,000 people abroad compared to
100,000 living in Tonga in 1992), it would probably reveal a hefty rate of
growth per capita for the last twenty years, instead of the dismal growth
exhibited by current gross domestic product (0 percent per year between
1985 and 1990; World Bank 1993a). Whether or not the corresponding
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all welfare of the whole community is what counts.
The resources of Samoans, Cook Islanders, Niueans, Tokelauans, Tuvaluans,
I-Kiribati, Fijians, Indo-Fijians, and Tongans, are no longer confined to their
national boundaries. They are located wherever these people are living, per-
manently or otherwise. . . . Although this flow of goods is generally not in-
cluded in official statistics, much of the welfare of ordinary people of Oceania
depends on an informal movement along ancient routes drawn in bloodlines
invisible to the enforcers of the laws of confinement and regulated mobility.
(Hau‘ofa 1994, 156)
Would it be better today if Tonga, the Cook Islands, or Western Sâmoa
had followed the standard recipes for “self-sustained” development, by
specializing in agricultural exports, for example (a very risky venture espe-
cially when cyclones seem to strike almost every other year), or by attempt-
ing to develop mass tourism, at the risk of provoking great disruptive
changes in the local cultural and social structure, and of living at the
mercy of a very whimsical clientele (cyclones are also a handicap here)?
People chose instead to emigrate to relieve their islands from the law of
diminishing returns to labor when land becomes scarce, and to visit and
establish themselves in overseas countries instead of trying to lure over-
seas travelers for a living. Is not this a wise choice in the end, from the
collective welfare point of view?
Material welfare is not the only thing that matters, of course. Commu-
nal living, the reciprocity system, are all part of a culture that emphasizes
shared values. These values conflict with private sector development be-
cause of “the expense of meeting communal commitments from any busi-
ness profits. Available funds from businesses are often spent on extended
family commitments, ceremonial expenses, church contributions, travel
and gifts” (MacMaster 1993, 9). But “taxing” business people and civil
servants, who represent the modern sector, to subsidize communal and
family activities in the traditional sphere, is perfectly rational, in the end.
“Let the neo-colonial bureaucrats or the development economists com-
plain as they may, this is neither ‘waste’ nor ‘backwardness’. Precisely it is
development from the perspective of the people concerned: their own cul-
ture on a bigger and better scale” (Sahlins 1992, 26). The traditional sec-
tor in the Pacific Islands produces some material welfare, such as food
and mats and so on, and (as a by-product) immaterial welfare, such as
88 the contemporary pacific • spring 1998ceremonies, gatherings, dancing and singing contests, and a relatively
carefree way of living.
People who live in the traditional sector “tax” those who choose the
modern sector (businesspersons, civil servants, emigrants), for the same
reason taxpayers in the modern industrial states have to subsidize public
parks, natural reserves, museums, ballet, symphonic orchestras. The natu-
ral environment and the arts representing a cultural heritage are believed
to represent a welfare value above and beyond their market value. They
should be subsidized because they bring about “positive external effects”
for the community. The same is true for “traditional sector activities” in
Pacific islands.
If one assumes that traditional activities produce positive cultural
external effects, then it is easy to show formally, using a “collective wel-
fare function” with both material and “cultural” welfare components,
that a tax on the modern sector to subsidize traditional sector activity is
required to reach the optimum resource allocation necessary to maximize
welfare (Poirine 1993a). This is just what is done informally in Pacific
islands, through remittances from emigrants and payments made to the
extended family and village community by businesspersons, profession-
als, and civil servants. It may lead to a lower gross domestic product, but,
in theory at least, to a higher collective welfare level, if welfare is consid-
ered the result of both material and cultural outputs from a community.
Aid without Apology: Aid Is Trade
International aid is also a receipt from an invisible export of geostrategic
services (Poirine 1993b, 1995c), and there is no reason to apologize for or
feel guilty about receiving it. It has proved a rather stable source of reve-
nue, especially for the sparsely populated islands, and for those that have
maintained the closest political ties with their former colonial power, even
though the end of the cold war has probably diminished the “world
price” of this geostrategic “commodity.”
One of the main arguments against aid is its “booming sector effect,”
which “shifts the economy away from the nation’s comparative advan-
tage” (Weisman 1990, 20). But what if the nation’s comparative advantage
was aid, or, more precisely, the export of geostrategic services traded
against aid? Many scholars have studied the motives for bilateral aid, and
most of them have found, by means of regression analysis, that aid seems
guided more by the “donor’s interest” than by the “recipient’s needs.”9
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pendent islands, receive much more bilateral aid per capita than do other
countries? (Poirine 1995c). Table 2 shows that island territories and asso-
ciated states receive $3,063 per capita, while independent islands of less
than one million people receive $83 per capita, that is, 37 times less. French
island overseas territories and departments receive $3,542 per capita, 354
times as much as the average of $10 per capita received by all less devel-
oped countries. Tables 3 and 4 show that American Sâmoa receives 5 times
more aid than Western Sâmoa, New Caledonia receives 17 times more aid
than Vanuatu (a former joint French-British territory), and Guam receives
17 times more aid than does Kiribati.
Islands have more strategic importance than continental countries of
equivalent land area. They command great surfaces of ocean; they are
often just off the coast of great continental countries; they are ideal “air-
craft carriers,” missile bases, or radar bases in case of war. The big indus-
trial states know by experience that it is of utmost importance that no
rival power be able to install strategic bases or even to make agreements
with island governments to allow for future possible authorizations to do
so in case of a crisis.10 The third world war, had it happened, would have
occurred because of the Cuba missile crisis: Cuba is an island, strategi-
cally located off the coastline of the United States. The declining geostra-
tegic value of Cuba since the breakup of the Soviet Union and the end of
the cold war has meant a sudden and catastrophic fall in the amount of
aid received by Cuba from its former donor. The next to last war in which
the British army and navy were involved took place in the Falkland Islands
in 1982. Many lives were taken there not long ago, and quite a few mighty
vessels were sunk, just for a very small island off the coast of Argentina. A
year later (1983), nineteen American soldiers were killed in Grenada in
order to drive the Cuban army out of this island. Australia gives most of its
aid to its closest island neighbor and former colony, Papua New Guinea.
Other world powers want to use islands for atomic or ballistic experi-
ments, because they are “out of the way” and difficult to spy on by rival
powers, and because their isolation minimizes the risk of such experiments
for the home population. Nonindependent islands (territories, associated
states) have more strategic value for the donor country because it retains
sovereignty rights over defense matters, whatever the legal arrangement
through which this is obtained (such as the Compact of Free Association
in the case of the United States and the Micronesian states of the Republic
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poirine • should we hate or love mirab? 91of the Marshall Islands, the Federated States of Micronesia, and the Re-
public of Palau).
This is why islands receive much more aid per capita (especially Pacific
islands, which eloquently demonstrated their strategic value in the last
world war, even though they seem extremely remote), and why territories
and “associated” islands receive even more.
It is neither moral, nor immoral, to receive aid from industrial states, if
nothing immoral is asked for in return. An island has strategic value, it
can sell “strategic services” to world powers. It is its comparative advan-
tage in international trade. The only problem with this is the sustainabil-
ity of aid. When the rivalry between great world powers is less acute, as
has been the case since 1989 and the end of the Soviet Union, then the
demand for strategic services falls somewhat. There is less competition
between the buyers of this commodity on the world market. In many
cases there is now a monopsony (only one buyer), which is not favor-
able for the sellers. Revenues from strategic services might be less stable
than those from remittances, in the end-of-the-cold-war context, as Cuba,
French Polynesia, and the Micronesian islands associated with the United
States now seem to be experiencing at their expense. (For a formal
“theory of aid as trade,” see Poirine 1993b, 1995c.)
Conclusion
There is no reason to hate or love mirab, to judge it evil or good. It is nei-
ther moral nor immoral. It is a pareto-efficient, welfare-maximizing strat-
egy to export labor services and geostrategic services when this is in line
with the comparative advantage of a given country. Dutch-disease effects
of the revenues from such export activities are predictable by-products of
this strategy, as resources are redirected toward their most efficient use,
that is, the production of future migrants by investment in human capital,
which entails housing and consumption expenditures, not “physical
investment,” or the production of geostrategic services involving more
public sector jobs in military bases or in government. The welfare of the
whole community, whatever its residence, grows as a result of this inter-
national specialization strategy, as it should in every case when a restric-
tion on the free international trade of goods and services is removed. Labor
is just another good, and therefore the welfare gains from emigration are
just a particular case of the welfare gains from trade liberalization (Kemp
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96 the contemporary pacific • spring 19981993). Remittances are a cultural device that help make everyone better
off after specialization in labor export, by ensuring compensation for the
nonmigrants from the sending country. If they did not exist, welfare econ-
omists would invent them. Fortunately, the people of Oceania did not
wait for economists to invent the mirab way to obtain welfare gains
along the pareto optimal rule: making no one worse off after emigration,
but a lot more people better off. They will probably keep on doing it as
long as they find it benefits them.
As for dependence on international aid, if one recognizes that aid is
trade, then the exhortation to “trade, not aid,” is clearly misplaced. Aid is
no more unstable or unsustainable than any other kind of export revenue.
Some islands are dependent on export revenues from one or two com-
modities, such as sugarcane, phosphate, or tourism; this dependence may
be much riskier in the long run. There is no reason to feel guilty or to
apologize about receiving aid money, as some puritanical moralists would
suggest. It follows from another comparative advantage of small islands:
a privileged geographical position that enhances their strategic value, a
small population that enables this “geostrategic service” to earn more
dollars per capita. Small islands should go on accepting aid without apol-
ogy, and even though this kind of export may give unstable revenues over
the years, it is probably far more reliable than crop exports (risky for
cyclone-prone tropical islands and with highly unstable world prices) or
tourism (a very whimsical and cyclical business). The amount of aid may
be negotiated and planned in the long term (see Micronesia’s fifteen-year
compacts of free association and French Polynesia’s ten-year pacte de pro-
grès, from 1996 to 2006).
The smaller the island’s population, the closer its political and military
ties with world or regional powers, the higher its comparative advantage
in geostrategic service production.
The Dutch disease or “booming sector” effect of aid and remittances is
not a disease after all. It is just an optimal resource allocation process,
whereby resources are made available to the “booming sectors,” where
the rate of return on (capital and human) investment is much higher, thus
crowding out resources available to the “traded goods” sectors: agricul-
ture, industry, and tourism, where returns are lower. This is just what is
required for a globally efficient economy, provided the receipts from ex-
ported labor and geostrategic services are sustainable. This is now the
poirine • should we hate or love mirab? 97heart of the matter, however, because since the end of the cold war and
the collapse of the Soviet Union, the geostrategic value of islands like the
Marshall Islands, Palau, the Northern Marianas, Guam, and French
Polynesia seems to dwindle rapidly. The end of the “geostrategic rent” is
predicted for 2001 in the former trust territory of Micronesia (2003 for
Palau), and for 2006 in French Polynesia.11 These islands should take
measures now to take into account this shift in their comparative advan-
tage, by boosting other export industries, such as tourism. Such a radical
change, from military activity to tourism, was succesfully accomplished
by Hawai‘i and Guam, for example. It requires a strong political will and
a far-sighted economic policy, when the population has been used to rely-
ing on “geostrategic rent” for a very long time (the problem is similar to
that of oil- or phosphate-dependent countries when the natural resource
is depleted). The failure to adapt in time to the changing comparative
advantage is really the disease that must be feared. The Dutch successfully
recovered from their natural gas boom, Hawai‘i and Guam from their
“geostrategic boom.” It is to be hoped that Micronesia’s and French Poly-
nesia’s economies will also adapt to the new reality of the post–cold war
era. Pearl farming and tourism are two possible alternatives to replace
geostrategic rents.
* * *
I wish to thank John Lodejwiks and the Centre for South Pacific Studies, Uni-
versity of New South Wales, for inviting me to the centre, where the first draft of
this paper was written. I am most grateful to Linley Chapman for her extensive
editing of my manuscript. I apologize for any remaining imperfections; my com-
mand of the English language is far from perfect.
Notes
1 Another theory is that remittances are motivated by a desire to minimize
risk by pooling income from several geographically diversified labor markets,
remittances being viewed as insurance premiums against shortfalls in income,
with family members striking an implicit co-insurance contract (Stark 1991a,
chapters 4,5,6; Rempel and Lobdell 1978; Lucas and Stark 1985; Kaufmann and
Lindauer 1986). Other authors have explained private intrafamily transfers by
98 the contemporary pacific • spring 1998an exchange of cash for private in-kind services (Bernheim, Sheifer, and Summers
1985; Cox 1987). This exchange can be contemporaneous or extended over the
life cycle: “Cash transfers given today might be repaid, in cash or in kind, in
future years” (Cox and Jimenez 1990, 209).
2 For example, Stark proposed a model of purely altruistic behavior (1991a,
237–238), then rejected it, but retained the possibility that some part of remit-
tances may come from “enlightened self-interest” or “tempered altruism.” “But
this does not deny that altruism may be an important or even critical component.
Rather, the evidence in this chapter lends support to a more eclectic model,
which is labeled tempered altruism or enlightened self interest” (Stark 1991a,
248). Another example is Cox: “Two motives are considered: altruism and
exchange. Evidence presented here casts doubt on the altruistic model of transfer
behavior” (1987, 508).
3 By contrast, family solidarity seems to vanish in the welfare states, where
mutual help between generations has been institutionalized and has become in
most cases monopoly of the mandatory pension and social security systems.
4 A good example of a contrast between aided and nonaided development is
given by Réunion and neighboring Mauritius in the Indian Ocean. While manu-
facturing and tourism stagnate in the French Department of Réunion, an island
heavily subsidized by the French government ($4,121 per capita; see table 3),
they are booming in Mauritius, where aid per capita is more than a hundred
times lower ($32; see table 4).
5 In modern welfare states, people pay back through social security payments
to the elderly or pay for pensions, and those payments replace help to parents
and grandparents. But people pay anyway, through a complicated, very elaborate
(and costly) national transfer system.
6 Most of them are unrecorded (see Brown 1995a).
7 See Poirine (1995b). Foster (1995) found a strong negative correlation
between remittances and the borrowing rate of interest in the case of Tonga and
Western Sâmoa. This is evidence in favor of the “informal loan” theory of remit-
tances: when interest rates rise for borrowing, home families tend to save less for
human capital investment for children, and more for capital investment (hous-
ing, farms), to save the opportunity cost of the higher interest rate on bor-
rowing. This lowers the “home” supply curve of loanable funds for human capi-
tal investment, and therefore raises the “shadow family interest rate.” Children
then borrow (informally, through their home guardians) from emigrant parents,
siblings, or relatives, to finance their education. Emigrants are willing to increase
their supply of loanable funds because the shadow family interest rate has gone
up and compares favorably with the market interest rate on savings in the host
country.
poirine • should we hate or love mirab? 998 In practice, to follow these rules, countries like Tonga and Western Sâmoa
should bring the growth of new migration under control, since they are currently
experiencing a natural growth rate in the vicinity of 2.5 percent, while the island
resident population is growing at a rate of only 0.5 percent, which means
that the emigrant population grows much faster than the resident population.
That is, the share of emigrants in the total population is continuously increasing.
Since 1990, private unrequited transfers have been declining in Tonga, where
expatriates numbered 45,000, while the resident population numbered 95,500 in
that year, which translates to a 32 percent share of emigrants in the total popula-
tion. Private unrequited transfers have been steadily increasing in Western
Sâmoa, where the expatriate community numbers 100,000 while the resident
population numbers 160,000, which translates to a 38 percent share of emi-
grants in the total population (Cuthbertson and Cole 1995). In Tonga, however,
remittances have declined as a percentage of gross domestic product, from 40
percent in the mid-eighties to 28 percent in 1989. Ahlburg made a different esti-
mate for emigrants: he stated that in 1989 there were 39,400 Tongan-born
nationals and 76,200 Western Sâmoa–born expatriates (1991), which translates
respectively into 29 percent and 32 percent of the total resident and expatriate
population.
9 For a recent review of the literature on bilateral aid, see Gounder (1994).
Among the authors who found empirical support for the “donor’s interest”
theory, are Maizels and Nissanke (1984) and McKinlay and Little (1977), and
for island states and territories, Poirine (1995c).
10 One of the main provisions of the Compact of Free Association between
the United States, the Republic of the Marshall Islands, the Federated States of
Micronesia, and Palau is to deny any other power the right to use their territory
for strategic or military purposes. In exchange, the United States will provide for
fifteen years an amount of aid much greater than an independent non-“associ-
ated” island would receive.
11 The “loi d’orientation pour le développement de la Polynésie française”
provides French Polynesia 18 billion Pacific francs (us$180 million) a year from
1996 to 2006, to compensate for the loss of an equivalent annual amount from
military transfers provided before 1996 and linked to military spending in con-
nection with French nuclear testing in the Pacific, which came to an end in April
1996.
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Abstract
Bertram and Watters defined the mirab model (Migration, Remittances, Aid,
and Bureaucracy) as a development process where remittances and foreign aid
are the main resources of small island economies. Bertram suggested that it is a
perfectly “sustainable” development strategy, as long as the “rent” from remit-
tances and international aid continues. But there is a great reluctance on the part
of officials and economists to accept the model as valid and sustainable. To them,
it does not seem right to live off international aid and migrant remittances. A
favorable case can be made for mirab. Pacific Island peoples and governments
should not feel guilty about accepting aid and remittances, because such “exter-
nal resources” may be seen as representing revenues from invisible exports to
industrialized countries. By exporting labor and geostrategic services, small
Pacific Island states make the best use of the only comparative advantage they
may have in international trade. Donor countries and migrant host countries also
gain from this arrangement. In this paper, I look at reasons why some people
hate mirab, then show why everyone should love mirab.
keywords: aid, migration, remittances, small island states, sustainable
development
